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1. Introduction 
Life insurance companies play an increasingly important role within the financial 
sector.  While during the period 1980-85 total assets of life insurance companies constituted 
only 11% of GDP for a sample of 13 countries, for which data are available, they constituted 
28% for the period 1995-97 in the same countries. This increased importance is also reflected 
in the business volume of life insurers.  Whereas life insurance penetration – the ratio of 
premium volume to GDP – was at 1.2% during the period 1961-65, it reached 4.2% in the 
period 1996-2000 for a sample of 19 countries, for which data are available.   While this 
increased importance of life insurance both as provider of financial services and of investment 
funds on the capital markets is especially pronounced for developed countries, many 
developing countries still experience very low levels of life insurance consumption. However, 
even within the group of developing countries, there are striking differences.  While South 
Africa’s penetration ratio was 12.7% over the period 1996-2000, Syria’s was less than 0.01%.  
Given the large variation in the use of life insurance across countries, the question of the 
causes of this variation and therefore the determinants of life insurance consumption arises. 
Life insurance provides individuals and the economy as a whole with a number of 
important financial services.  First, life insurance products encourage long-term savings and 
the re-investment of substantial sums in private and public sector projects. By leveraging their 
role as financial intermediaries, life insurers have become a key source of long-term finance, 
encouraging the development of capital markets (Catalan, Impavido and Musalem, 2000; 
Impavido and Musalem, 2000).
1  Indeed,  several studies have found evidence that the 
development of the insurance sector is related to economic growth (Ward and Zurbruegg, 
2000; Webb, 2000; Soo, 1996). Second, in the face of increasing urbanization, mobility of the   2
population, and formalization of economic relationships between individuals, families, and 
communities, life insurance has taken increasing importance as a way for individuals and 
families to manage income risk.    
The importance of life insurance for economic and financial development directs us to 
investigate which economic, demographic, and institutional factors give rise to a vibrant life 
insurance market. A core set of socio-economic determinants has been identified as good 
predictors of life insurance consumption by several studies. The relatively limited data 
samples and different measures of consumption used in these studies, however, has limited 
their scope and made it difficult to generalize from their conclusions.    
This paper improves on the existing literature in several ways.  First, the new data set 
extends significantly the coverage of countries and time periods. Previous cross-sectional and 
panel studies have been limited in depth or in breadth.
2  We use a data set spanning 68 
countries over the period 1961-2000 and aggregate data at different frequencies.   
Second, panel analysis allows us to exploit both cross-country and time series 
variation in life insurance consumption and its potential determinants.  We can thus better 
assess what has driven the rapid increase in life insurance consumption over the last four 
decades. At the same time, cross-sectional analysis allows us to analyze the effect of time-
invariant determinants and control for biases induced by reverse causation and simultaneity. 
Third,  by using several alternative measures of life insurance consumption we provide 
additional depth and robustness to the results.  Life insurance premium and life insurance in 
force, the outstanding face amounts plus dividend additions of life insurance policies, measure 
different aspects of life insurance consumption.     3
Finally,  we introduce a new measure for exploring the role of life insurance in the 
economy - its relative weight within individual savings' portfolios.  This variable measures the 
weight that life insurance premiums have in an economy’s private savings.      
The results of this study  are expected to assist policy makers understand what drives 
the supply and demand of life insurance.  The results may help design strategies for 
developing nascent life insurance markets and extending their benefits to a greater number of 
countries. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
measures of life insurance consumption.  Section 3 discusses potential determinants of life 
insurance consumption.  Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring Life Insurance across Countries 
Life insurance policies are financial products that offer two main services:  1) income 
replacement for premature death; and 2) a long-term savings instrument. While there are a 
multitude of different types of policies, each offering the consumer different options with 
regard to coverage and investment choice, they can be broken down into two general 
categories : 1) those offering mortality coverage only; and, 2) those combining mortality 
coverage with a savings component. Policies within the first category are generally referred to 
in the U.S. and many other countries as "term" policies, while those in the second category are 
known as whole life, universal life, variable life, endowment, and by a variety of other names.  
Policies in the second category typically earn interest, which is returned to the consumer 
through policy dividends, cash-values on termination of the policy, or endowment sums on 
maturation of the policy.  These  policies incorporate varying amounts of  mortality coverage 
while generally offering a substantial savings component.          4
In addition to the above-mentioned categories of life insurance, life insurers also sell 
annuity policies.  An annuity is a contractual arrangement whereby, in return for a lump sum 
or a series of periodic payments up until the moment of annuitization, the  insurer promises to  
the insured a series of periodic payments, often up until his/her death.  Insurers providing 
annuities thus undertake risks associated with supperannuation or longevity of the insured.    
As the different measures of life insurance consumption that we will be using in our 
empirical analysis aggregate both categories of life insurance policies as well as annuity 
policies, we cannot distinguish between the demand and supply of mortality risk coverage, 
longevity risk coverage, and savings through life insurance. This aggregation in the data 
produces a bias against finding significant relations.
3  Significant results between the variables 
hypothesized to affect insurance consumption and the amount consumed are therefore likely 
to be a sign of the added robustness of these relations.   
Life Insurance Penetration is defined as the ratio of premium volume to GDP and 
measures the importance of insurance activity relative to the size of the economy. Life 
Insurance Penetration, however, is not a perfect measure of consumption since it is the 
product of quantity and price.  A higher premium volume might therefore reflect a higher 
quantity, a higher price or a difference in the mix of mortality, savings and annuity elements 
purchased.  Lack of competition and costly regulation might increase the price of insurance 
without implying a higher level of insurance consumption. 
Life Insurance Density, our second indicator of life insurance consumption, is 
defined as premiums per capita expressed in constant dollars. It indicates how much each 
inhabitant of the country spends on average on insurance in constant dollars.
4  Although both 
Life Insurance Penetration and Life Insurance Density use gross premiums, there remain   5
important differences between both measures; Life Insurance Penetration measures life 
insurance consumption relative to the size of the economy, while Life Insurance Density 
compares life insurance consumption across countries without adjusting for the income level 
of the economy.  Consumers that purchase life insurance policies to insure their dependents 
against mortality risk will potentially buy more coverage and thus a higher face value in richer 
countries, since the death benefit has to replace a larger income.  We therefore expect Life 
Insurance Density to be more income elastic than Life Insurance Penetration.  
Since life insurance policies can be regarded as much an insurance product as a 
savings product, we can relate the total premiums to private savings rather than income. This 
implies a portfolio rather than income approach, treating life insurance policies as one of 
several assets investors can choose from. We therefore construct Life Insurance in Private 
Savings, which equals total premiums divided by private savings and indicates the share of 
private savings that inhabitants of a country invest in life insurance policies.
5  Due to data 
restrictions, this indicator is only available for the period 1970-95. 
Our final measure of life insurance consumption is Life Insurance in Force to GDP. 
It equals the sum of the face amounts plus dividend additions of life insurance policies 
outstanding as a share of GDP.  It is a measure of mortality risk underwritten plus savings 
accumulated.  Life insurance in force thus contains both the cash value of policies, associated 
with the savings component of life insurance policies and the net amount of risk faced by life 
insurers.  Unlike the other three indicators, Life Insurance in Force to GDP does not include 
the price and so measures only quantity.  Due to data restrictions, this indicator is only 
available for the period 1961-1994.   6
The mortality risk, savings and annuity components have different weights in the 
premium and in the stock measures.  For a given structure of the insurance market, the 
mortality risk component, as measured by the net amount of risk, has a stronger weight in Life 
Insurance in Force to GDP than in the other three measures.  In most, but not all countries, 
Life Insurance in Force does not include annuities.
 6  
Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlations for all variables. We observe a 
large variation in levels of life insurance consumption across countries. Whereas Syria had a 
Life Insurance Penetration of less than 0.01 % of GDP during 1996-2000, South Africa’s 
penetration ratio was 12.7 % during the same period.  Syrians spent less than one dollar per 
year on life insurance services during 1996-2000, whereas Japanese spent more than 3,200 
dollars. Ecuadorians invested less than 1% of total savings in life insurance policies in 1991-
95, while U.K. citizens invested more than 40% during 1986-90.  Similarly, Greece’s Life 
Insurance in Force to GDP constituted less than 0.1% of GDP during 1976-80,  whereas 
Japan’s reached nearly 400% of GDP in 1991-95.  There are large correlations between all 
three measures of life insurance consumption that are significant at the 1% level.   
 
3. Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption 
This section describes the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical tests and different 
factors hypothesized to drive the demand and supply of life insurance policies. Table 2 
summarizes the potential determinants of life insurance consumption and their hypothesized 
sign, while Table A1 describes construction and sources of the variables.
7   7
3.1. Theoretical Underpinnings 
Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) were the first to develop a theoretical framework to 
explain the demand for life insurance.  Within this framework, the demand for life insurance 
is attributed to a person's desire to bequeath funds to dependents and provide income for 
retirement.    The consumer maximizes lifetime utility subject to a vector of interest rates and 
a vector of prices including insurance premium rates.  This framework posits the demand for 
life insurance to be a function of wealth, expected income over an individual's lifetime, the 
level of interest rates, the cost of life insurance policies (administrative costs), and the 
assumed subjective discount rate for current over future consumption.   
Lewis (1989) extends this framework by explicitly incorporating the preferences of the 
dependents and beneficiaries into the model.  Specifically, he derives the demand for life 
insurance as a maximization problem of the beneficiaries, the spouse and the offspring of the 
life insurance policyholder.  Deriving utility maximization by both spouse and offspring 
separately and assuming no bequest by the policyholder and an isoelastic utility function, 
Lewis shows that total life insurance demand can be written as follows: 
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where l is the policy loading factor – the ratio of the costs of the insurance to its actuarial 
value -, p the probability of the primary wage earner’s death, F the face value of all life 
insurance written on the primary wage earner’s life, δ a measure of the beneficiaries’ relative 
risk aversion, TC the present value of consumption of each offspring until he/she leaves the 
household and of the spouse over his/her predicted remaining life span and W the household’s 
net wealth. Life insurance demand increases with the probability of the primary wage earner’s   8
death, the present value of the beneficiaries’ consumption and the degree of risk aversion. 
Life insurance demand decreases with the loading factor and the household’s wealth.  
Life insurance consumption, however, is not only driven by consumer demand.  There 
are important supply-side factors which affect the availability and price of life insurance. 
Insurance companies need both the human and information resources to effectively measure 
the pricing and reserving requirements for products as well as adequate investment 
opportunities in financial markets.  An adequate protection of property rights and an effective 
enforcement of contracts also facilitate the investment function of life insurers.  These supply 
factors are expected to affect the costs of life insurance products, and might therefore be 
represented by the policy-loading factor in the above-described Lewis model.  
While there have been attempts to model the relation between the supply and demand 
of life insurance separately, data limitations have restricted the empirical testing of these 
hypotheses.
8  The available data do not allow us to distinguish between supply and demand.  
Furthermore, premium data do not allow us to observe the actual amount of insurance 
coverage purchased, as they are a combined measure of price and level of coverage.  Unless 
the price is constant across countries, which is unlikely, assuming that the premium is 
equivalent to the amount of coverage would introduce a source of noise in our estimations.  
On the other hand, using the variable often used to proxy price (premiums over life insurance 
in force) requires one to make a troublesome assumption, namely, that the mix of policies 
remains constant across countries and time.
9 
Price, however, is undoubtedly an important determinant in the consumption of life 
insurance, and leaving it out may subject the empirical testing to omitted variable bias.  We 
address this problem in two ways.  First, we assume that the price is a function of several   9
supply-side factors.  Varying levels of urbanization, monetary stability, institutional 
development, political stability, and banking sector development all impact the insurer's 
ability to provide cost-effective insurance.  Second, we use panel estimation techniques that 
eliminate biases due to omitted variables, such as the price variable in our model. 
In the following we will describe different variables that may be linked to the demand 
function described by Lewis (1989) as well as several supply factors that might proxy for the 
policy loading factor.  While the Lewis model, described above, focuses on the mortality risk 
component of life insurance policies, we will link the different determinants also to the 
savings and annuity components of life insurance policies. Finally, the portfolio approach 
underlying Life Insurance in Private Savings adds an additional dimension to the discussion.  
3.2. Demographic Variables 
A higher ratio of young dependents to working population is assumed to increase the 
demand for mortality coverage and decrease the demand for savings through life insurance 
and annuities.   On the one hand, a larger share of dependents increases the total present value 
of consumption of the insured’s beneficiaries, and therefore the demand for life insurance that 
provides dependents with payments in the event of the premature death of the primary wage 
earner.
10  On the other hand, a high dependency ratio indicates the extent to which the 
population is too young to consider saving for retirement, and therefore reduced demand for 
savings through life insurance products. Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986), Browne and 
Kim (1993) and Truett and Truett (1986) find that the young dependency ratio is positively 
correlated with life insurance penetration.  Given opposite effects of the young dependency 
ratio on the mortality and savings components of life insurance, however, we predict that a 
higher young dependency ratio is ambiguously correlated with life insurance.     10
A higher ratio of old dependents to working population is assumed to increase the 
demand for the savings and annuity components and decrease the demand for the mortality 
risk component of life insurance. We conjecture that in countries with a larger share of retired 
population, savings through life insurance policies as well as protection against 
superannuation gains importance, while insurance against the death of the primary wage 
earner loses importance.  The overall effect of the old dependency ratio is therefore predicted 
to be ambiguous. 
Societies with longer life expectancies should have lower mortality coverage costs, 
lower perceived need for mortality coverage, but higher savings through life insurance 
vehicles and more demand for annuities.
11  This would imply an ambiguous correlation with 
the demand for life insurance products.
12  Previous authors [Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria 
(1986) and Outreville (1996)] have found life expectancy to be positively related to Life 
Insurance Penetration. 
We expect that a higher level of education in a population will be positively correlated 
with the demand for any type of life insurance product. A higher level of a person's education 
may raise his/her ability to understand the benefits of risk management and long-term savings, 
therefore  increasing an individual’s level of risk aversion.
13  Education may also increase the 
demand for pure death protection by lengthening the period of dependency, as well as 
increasing the human capital of, and so the value to be protected in, the primary wage 
earner.
14 However, a positive relation between education and life insurance might also 
indicate that better access to long-tem savings and insurance instruments encourages access to 
higher education.
15  Truett and Truett (1990) and Browne and Kim (1993) find a positive   11
relation between life insurance consumption and the level of education. We use the average 
years of schooling in the population over 25 and the gross secondary enrollment rate. 
The religious inclination of a population may affect its risk aversion and its attitude 
towards the institutional arrangements of insurance.
16  Religious opposition against life 
insurance, while stronger in European countries before the 19
th century, still persists in several 
Islamic countries today.
17  Followers of Islam have traditionally been known to disapprove of 
life insurance because it is considered a hedge against the will of Allah.
18  Unsurprisingly, 
Browne and Kim (1993), and Meng (1994), find a dummy variable for Islamic countries to be 
negatively correlated with life insurance demand.  This study employs a broader measure of 
religious inclination by including Protestantism, Catholicism and a composite of other 
religions, defined as the ratio of adherents of one religion over the entire population.  While 
we expect the Muslim share of the population to be negatively related to life insurance 
demand, we do not have prior expectations about the signs on the other religion variables.   
Economies with a higher share of urban to total population are expected to have higher 
levels of life insurance consumption.  The concentration of consumers in a geographic area 
simplifies the distribution of life insurance products, as costs related to marketing, premium 
collection, underwriting and claim handling are reduced.  A higher share of urban population 
is also correlated with less reliance on informal insurance agreements and therefore may 
induce a higher demand for formal insurance products.  
3.3. Economic Variables 
Life insurance consumption should rise with the level of income, for several reasons.  
First, an individual’s consumption and human capital typically increase along with income, 
creating a greater demand for insurance (mortality coverage) to safeguard the income   12
potential of the insured and the expected consumption of his/her dependents.
19  Second, life 
insurance may be a luxury good, inasmuch as increasing income may explain an increasing 
ability to direct a higher share of income towards retirement and investment-related life 
insurance products.  Finally, the overhead costs associated with administrating and marketing 
insurance can make larger size policies less expensive per dollar of insurance in force, which 
lowers the price of life insurance policies.  Campbell (1980), Lewis (1989), Beenstock, 
Dickinson, Khajuria (1986), Truett and Truett (1990), Browne and Kim (1993), and 
Outreville (1996) have all shown that the use of life insurance is positively related to income, 
using both aggregate national account data and individual household data.  We use real GDP 
per capita as well as an indicator of permanent income, calculated as the predicted value from 
a regression of the log of each country’s real GDP per capita on a time trend.  Insurance 
against mortality risk and consumption-saving decisions are related to permanent income or 
income over the life cycle rather than current income. 
Theory suggests an ambiguous relation between  life insurance and an economy’s 
private savings rate.  If agents save a larger share of their income, they might or might not be 
willing to increase savings in life insurance policies. We use the share of private savings in 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI). 
We expect inflation and its volatility to have a negative relationship with life insurance 
consumption. As life insurance savings products typically provide monetary benefits over the 
long term, monetary uncertainty has a substantial negative impact on these products’ expected 
returns.  Inflation can also have a disruptive effect on the life insurance industry when interest 
rate cycles spur disintermediation.
20   These dynamics make inflation an additional 
encumbrance to the product pricing decisions of life insurers, thus possibly reducing supply in   13
times of high inflation.
21  In addition  to the inflation rate and its standard deviation, we also 
test for a relation between  life insurance consumption and  the real interest rate, defined as 
the difference between the nominal interest rate and inflation. Theory predicts a positive 
relation; a higher real interest rate increases life insurer’s investment returns and so 
profitability, in turn offering improved profitability of financial relative to real investments for 
potential purchasers of life insurance policies.  
We expect banking sector development to be positively correlated with life insurance 
consumption.
22  Well-functioning banks may increase the confidence consumers have in other 
financial institutions, e.g. life insurers.  They also provide life insurers with an efficient 
payment system.  The efficient development of the entire financial system - as might be 
reflected in the absence of interest rate ceilings and other distortionary policies – is thought to 
help life insurers invest more efficiently.  However, a vibrant insurance sector might also 
foster the development of the banking sector, so that a positive relation between the two 
variables cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence for causality. Outreville (1996) finds a 
significantly positive relationship between financial development and life insurance 
penetration.  We use the total claims of deposit money banks on domestic nonfinancial sectors 
as share of GDP as indicator of banking sector development. 
We expect the size of a country’s social security system to be negatively correlated 
with the demand for life insurance products.  Kim (1988) and Meng (1994) postulate that 
social security displaces private insurance.  If a greater amount of retirement savings is being 
channeled through the government, or if the public sector provides substantial benefits to 
families of prematurely deceased wage earners, then there should be less demand for life   14
insurance products.
23 This study uses the share of public expenditures on social security and 
welfare as a share of GDP as an indicator of the size of the social security system. 
The expected correlation of the income distribution of a country with life insurance 
consumption is ambiguous.  Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986) reason that wealthy 
sections of the population do not need insurance protection while poorer sections have a 
limited demand because they operate under income budget constraints.
24  A more equal 
income distribution with a larger middle class might therefore result in a higher demand for 
life insurance.  On the other hand, while the middle-class may have the greatest demand for 
life insurance savings products, there may be a minimum level of income at which these 
policies become affordable.  Accordingly, a large middle class in a poor country may result in 
less individuals being able to purchase life insurance than a less equal distribution with a 
larger and/or wealthier upper class.  The resulting relation of income distribution with life 
insurance consumption is thus ambiguous. Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986) find a 
negative relation between the Gini coefficient and Life Insurance Penetration.  
We also test for a relation of life insurance consumption with the Human Development 
Indicator (HDI), as constructed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Specifically, this indicator indicates the relative distance of a country’s value between 
minimum and maximum values in life expectancy, education (both literacy and gross 
enrollment) and income (GDP per capita), averaged over the three areas. Values are therefore 
bounded between zero and one.  However, given that we expect an ambiguous relation of life 
expectancy with life insurance, we do not necessarily expect a robust relation of the HDI with 
our measures of life insurance consumption.  Outreville (1996) does not find a significant   15
relation of the HDI with life insurance consumption, while Outreville (1999) shows that the 
HDI is positively correlated with measures of financial development. 
3.4. Institutional Determinants 
The tenability of a vibrant life insurance market depends to a large extent on the 
institutional framework and political stability of a country.  If fraud is common in claim 
reporting, then the insurance mechanism will become prohibitively costly for a large part of 
the population.  The inability to appeal the breach of life insurance contracts by insurers 
reduces the value of an insurance contract to consumers and may deter them from committing 
large sums of money into these products.  The lack of property protection and contract 
enforcement impedes life insurers' ability to invest efficiently and control the price of their 
products.  Finally, the lack of political stability shortens the economic horizon of both 
potential buyers and suppliers of life insurance products, dampening the development of a 
healthy life insurance market. 
To measure these institutional and political factors, we use three different indicators.  
Rule of Law measures the degree to which citizens of a country are able to use the legal 
system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  We use the average number of Revolutions 
and Coups to indicate political stability of a country.  Institutional Development is the average 
of six indicators that measure voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  While Rule of Law 
(1982-2000) and Revolutions and Coups (1961-1990) are available over longer time periods, 
Institutional Development is only available for one point in time (1998), so that we will use it 
only in the cross-country estimations.   16
3.5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and Panel B correlations of all dependent 
and the independent variables in our baseline regression. Table A2 shows the correlations of 
life insurance with other independent variables. As can be seen in Table 1 (Panel A), there is a 
large variation in the economic and financial development of countries, their demographic 
structure, and macroeconomic performance. Most of the explanatory variables are correlated 
with life insurance consumption at the 5% level, with the notable exception of the Real 
Interest Rate and Revolutions and Coups (Panels B and Table A2).   Not all of the 
correlations, however, confirm the theoretical predictions.  Countries with a lower share of 
young population and a higher share of old population have higher levels of life insurance 
consumption, while a higher life expectancy is positively correlated with life insurance. Life 
insurance is higher in countries where governments spend more on transfers and other 
subsidies and where income distribution is more equal. Many of the potential determinants of 
life insurance are highly correlated with each other. Richer countries have older populations, 
higher life expectancies, higher levels of schooling, less inflation and better developed 
banking systems.  Countries with higher young dependency ratios have lower old dependency 
ratios and life expectancies and lower levels of education.  The high correlations between the 
explanatory variables underline the importance of performing multivariate regression 
analysis, as well as the need to control for country-specific effects that might drive several or 
all of these explanatory variables.    
   17
4. Empirical Results 
The correlation analysis in section 3 has shown significant correlations of life insurance 
consumption with many of the determinants postulated by theory, but also between many of 
these determinants.  We therefore conduct multivariate regression analysis to assess, which 
determinants robustly predict life insurance consumption, even after controlling for other 
potential effects.  The baseline regression contains real per capita GDP, young and old 
dependency ratios, average years of schooling, life expectancy, inflation rate and banking 
sector development.
25  In subsequent regressions we include a larger set of potential 
determinants of life insurance consumption.   
4.1. Panel Analysis, 1961-2000 
Our main results are based on an unbalanced panel of 68 countries, with data averaged 
over eight 5-year periods.
 26 Using a panel allows us to (i) exploit both cross-country and 
time-series variation in the data, and (ii) control for differences across countries and over time 
that are not accounted for by any of the explanatory variables.
 27 We will therefore control for 
both fixed country and time-specific effects in our regression and estimate the regression with 
either a fixed or a random effects model.
28 We average data over five years, since several of 
our explanatory variables are only available at a five-year frequency and others might be 
subject to short-tem business-cycle induced fluctuations.
29  
The results in Table 3 show that the variation of Life Insurance Penetration across 
countries can be explained by variation in income level, old dependency ratio, inflation and 
banking sector development.  These four variables show significant coefficients in our 
baseline regression and in most of our robustness tests. Schooling, life expectancy, and the 
young dependency ratio are not robust predictors of life insurance consumption.   18
The results of our baseline regression in column 1 indicate that a 10% increase in real 
per capita income increases Life Insurance Penetration by 5.7%, thus confirming that life 
insurance is a luxury good.  When we include Revolutions and Coups and the Private Savings 
Rate, however, the coefficient on income level turns insignificant, which is due to the smaller 
sample when including either of the two variables.
30  When we replace GDP per capita with 
permanent income – the predicted value from regressing each country’s time series of GDP 
per capita on a time trend – the results are confirmed (column 9).  
We find a positive relation between the old dependency ratio and Life Insurance 
Penetration. The coefficient size indicates that a 10% increase in the share of old population 
relative to the working population increases life insurance penetration by 12%.  This suggests 
a higher demand for savings and annuity products as the population grows older. 
Price stability is an important predictor of life insurance consumption.  The coefficient 
on the inflation rate is significantly negative in all specifications.  The effect of a stable 
macroeconomic environment is also economically large.  If Brazil - country with one of the 
highest five-year average inflation rates in our sample - had achieved an average inflation rate 
over the period 1991-95 of the sample median 7% instead of the actual 212%, Life Insurance 
Penetration might  have been 0.87% of GDP instead of 0.29%.
31 Replacing the inflation rate 
with the anticipated inflation rate – the average between current and next-year’s inflation rate 
– confirms the results (column 6).
32 Inflation volatility does not explain any variation in life 
insurance penetration across countries, while the real interest rate is positively related with 
Life Insurance Penetration, when controlling for inflation (columns 7 and 8).   
Banking sector development is positively correlated with Life Insurance Penetration.  
The coefficient on the indicator of banking sector development is significantly positive in all   19
specifications. As discussed above, the positive coefficient does not imply a causal impact of 
banking sector development on life insurance penetration.  It shows that countries with well-
developed banks also have higher levels of life insurance consumption.  In our cross-country 
analysis, below, we will try to control for reverse causation and simultaneity bias.    
Variation in the share of young population or in life expectancy cannot explain 
variation in Life Insurance Penetration across countries, confirming the hypothesis of 
offsetting effects of the young dependency ratio (life expectancy) on gross premiums, a 
positive (negative) effect on mortality risk and a negative (positive) effect on the saving and 
annuity components.
33  Neither average years of schooling nor secondary enrollment enter 
significantly at the 5% level in any of the regressions.   
Turning to our additional explanatory variables, we find a positive relation between 
the private savings rate and life insurance penetration. Urbanization (column 2), Gini 
coefficient (column 3), Social Security (column 4), Revolutions and Coups (column 5), the 
Human Development Indicator (column 11), and Rule of Law (column 12) cannot explain 
cross-country variation in life insurance penetration.
34 The last column presents the baseline 
regression with the sample limited to developing countries.  Only inflation and banking sector 
development continue to enter significantly at the 1% level, while income per capita enters 
significantly and positively at the 10% level.  The old dependency ratio cannot explain 
variation in Life Insurance Penetration across developing countries. 
  Table 4 present results with the other indicators of life insurance across countries as 
dependent variables. For each indicator we present two baseline regressions, one for the 
whole sample and one restricted to developing countries.  Life Insurance Density increases 
with higher income per capita, a higher old dependency ratio, a lower inflation rate and better   20
developed banks (column 1).  Once we restrict the sample to developing countries, however, 
only banking sector development enters significantly.  We note that the income elasticity of 
Life Insurance Density is higher than for Life Insurance Penetration, as expected.
35   
  Life Insurance in Private Savings increases with a higher old dependency ratio, lower 
inflation, and better developed banks (column 3). Interestingly, the share of savings in life 
insurance policies decreases with a higher saving rate.  Considering this result jointly with the 
positive coefficient (0.359) on the savings rate in the regression of Life Insurance Penetration 
(Table 3, column 13) suggests that while private agents invest some of their additional savings 
in life insurance policies, overall there is a shift away from life insurance policies to other 
savings instruments in private agents’ portfolio.  GDP per capita does not explain the share of 
savings in life insurance policies.  Turning to the sample of developing countries, only 
banking sector development (positively) and the private savings rate (negatively) can explain 
variation in the share of life insurance policies in private savings across developing countries.  
  Life Insurance in Force to GDP increases with higher income per capita, lower 
inflation, lower old dependency ratio and better developed banks.  While the results on GDP 
per capita, inflation and banking sector development confirm the results using Life Insurance 
Penetration and Density, the results of the old dependency ratio are certainly surprising. The 
relatively stronger weight of the mortality risk component and the exclusion of annuities in 
Life Insurance in Force to GDP compared to the other three measures might explain the 
opposite sign.
36   Only the results for income per capita and inflation are confirmed in the 
sample restricted to developing countries. 
4.2. Annual Panel, 1961-2000 
Table 5 presents results for a panel of annual observations. Using annual instead of 5-
year averages allows us to (i) maximize the information we have available and (ii) test the   21
sensitivity of our panel analysis to the frequency of the data.
37 As in the 5-year panel, Life 
Insurance Penetration increases with per capita income, the old dependency ratio, better 
developed banks and decreases with inflation.  Interestingly, in the annual sample we also 
find a negative relation between the young dependency ratio and Life Insurance Penetration 
indicating that countries with a higher share of young population have lower levels of life 
insurance consumption.
38 As in the 5-year panel, anticipated inflation has a negative relation 
with Life Insurance Penetration (column 3), while the real interest rate, permanent income, 
and the private savings rate (column 2, 4 and 5) enter positively. Neither schooling nor life 
expectancy shows a robust relation with Life Insurance Penetration. Only income per capita, 
inflation and banking sector development explain variation in life insurance penetration across 
developing countries in the annual sample. Overall, the annual sample thus confirms the 
findings from the 5-year panel regressions. 
4.3. Cross-country Analysis, 1980-2000 
Table 6 presents results from cross-country regressions where we average data over 
the period 1980 to 2000 for all countries in our sample.  While cross-country analysis does not 
allow us to control for omitted variables, as in the panel analysis, we can test the relation of 
life insurance across countries and several time-invariant variables and use instrumental-
variable regressions to control for biases induced by simultaneity and reverse causation.  As 
mentioned above, these biases might especially arise for educational attainment and banking 
sector development. 
Countries with higher levels of economic and financial development, a more educated 
population, lower inflation and lower life expectancy have higher Life Insurance Penetration.  
Further, the old dependency ratio enters negatively and significantly at the 10% level.
39    22
While the results on income per capita, inflation and banking sector development confirm the 
results from our panel analysis, the results on life expectancy, schooling and old dependency 
ratio differ from the previous results.  Restricting the sample to developing countries confirms 
the results only for life expectancy, inflation, schooling and the old dependency ratio, but not 
for income per capita and banking sector development. The young dependency ratio, the 
private savings rate and Revolutions and Coups do not enter significantly in the regressions 
(columns 3 and 5). A larger share of Muslim population decreases Life Insurance Penetration, 
while a better institutional environment increases it (columns 4 and 6). 
Econometric, sampling and frequency differences might explain the differences 
between panel and cross-country results.  The panel estimations allow us to control for 
country-specific effects, which the OLS regressions do not.
40  Economic and demographic 
factors might have different relations with life insurance consumption across countries than 
within countries over time. 
Our cross-country results have shown a positive relation between schooling and 
banking sector development and life insurance consumption. These results, however, do not 
allow us to make any inference concerning a causal relation between education and banking, 
on the one side, and the development of the life insurance sector, on the other side.  We 
therefore present two Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions, where we extract the exogenous 
components of banking sector development and schooling to control for reverse causation and 
simultaneity bias in the empirical relation between these variables and life insurance. 
Specifically, we use dummy variables indicating the origin of a country’s legal system and a 
variable – Good crops - proxying for agricultural endowments conducive to a large middle 
class and institutional development.
41  Legal origin and agricultural endowments are both   23
exogenous variables and are highly correlated with banking sector development and schooling 
as confirmed by the first stage regressions.
42  We use the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions (OIR) to examine whether there is any impact of legal origin and endowments on 
Life Insurance Penetration beyond their impact through banking sector development, 
schooling or the other explanatory variables.  In column 7 we instrument only for banking 
sector development and in column 8 for both banking sector development and schooling.  
While banking sector development enters significantly and positively, even after 
instrumenting, schooling turns insignificant in column 8 where we instrument for it.  The test 
of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected in either case, confirming the adequacy of our 
instruments.
43 These results indicate that the relation between banking sector development 
and life insurance is not due to reverse causation and simultaneity bias, while the significant 
relation between education and life insurance is most likely a spurious one. 
Overall, the cross-country results confirm the importance of income per capita, 
monetary stability and banking sector development in predicting life insurance across 
countries.  We find evidence for the importance of religion and institutional development for 
life insurance. Finally, the demographic variables show a different relation with life insurance 
in the cross-section than in the panel.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzed the determinants of life insurance consumption in a panel of 68 
countries over the period 1961-2000, using  four different indicators of life insurance 
consumption.  Our main results are based on a panel of eight non-overlapping 5-year periods.   24
We test for the sensitivity of the results with a panel of annual observations and a cross-
country sample. 
Our panel estimations show that countries with higher income levels, both current and 
permanent income, lower inflation and better developed banks have higher levels of life 
insurance consumption.  A higher ratio of old to working population increases Life Insurance 
Penetration and Density, while it decreases Life Insurance in Force to GDP, perhaps  
reflecting the different weights of mortality risk, savings and annuity components.  A higher 
private savings rate and a higher real interest rate are also associated with higher levels of life 
insurance consumption. The young dependency ratio, life expectancy and schooling are not 
strongly associated with life insurance consumption across countries.  
The share of life insurance premiums in private savings is best predicted by the old 
dependency ratio, inflation, banking sector development and the private savings rate, but not 
by income per capita.  The results suggest that the more aged the population and the lower the 
inflation, the more individuals will select life insurance over other forms of savings. The 
coefficient estimates on the private savings rate in the regressions of Life Insurance 
Penetration and Life Insurance in Private Savings indicate that additional private savings are 
partly invested in life insurance policies, but that the overall share of life insurance in private   
agents’ portfolios decreases as  they save more.  While restricting the sample to developing 
countries turns many of the results less significant, macroeconomic stability and well 
developed banks continue to predict life insurance across developing countries.    
The cross-country estimations confirm some of the panel results, while contradicting 
others. Most notably, we find a positive relation between schooling and life insurance, which 
is not robust, however, to controlling for biases induced by reverse causation and   25
simultaneity. The positive impact of banking sector development on life insurance, on the 
other hand, is robust to controlling for these biases by instrumenting with legal origin and 
endowments.  This evidence suggests that, in addition to the positive effect that life insurance 
may have on the banking system, banking sector development facilitates the development of  
life insurance and its contractual savings function. This does not contradict the positive 
impact of life insurance on capital market development, found by other authors. While an 
efficient banking system might help develop the life insurance sector by offering payment 
services and raising confidence in financial services, life insurance and other forms of 
contractual savings might foster the development of capital markets through their demand for 
long-term financial investments.   
In summary, income per capita, inflation and banking sector development are the most 
robust predictors of life insurance consumption across countries and over time. Further, 
religious and institutional differences can explain some of the variation in life insurance 
consumption across countries.  There is no robust link from schooling and the demographic 
variables to life insurance consumption. Finally, we note that although life insurance is a 
luxury good, there is no relation between income distribution and life insurance consumption. 
While rising income per capita plays a role in driving its consumption, it does not appear that 
income distribution does.    
  The results of this paper constitute a thorough review of existing hypotheses regarding 
the demand and supply of life insurance consumption. They also have implications for policy 
makers.  Both monetary stability and banking sector development have positive effects on 
economic development and growth independent of their positive effect on the development of 
the insurance sector.  Price stability and banking sector development, moreover, may be   26
fundamental to the growth of savings and investments through life insurance, particularly in a 
developing economy.     27
                                                 
1 For the economic and social importance of life insurance, especially in developing countries, see also 
UNCTAD (1982), one of the first studies in this area. 
2 Browne and Kim (1993) use data for 45 countries for the year 1987, and Outreville (1996) for 48 countries for 
the year 1986.  Truett and Truett (1990) produce estimates for two countries, the U.S. and Mexico, over the 
period 1960 to 1982, and Beenstock, Dickinson, and Khajuria (1986) for 10 Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1970-1981. 
3 See Browne and Kim (1993), footnote 1.  
4 We also calculate an alternative measure of life insurance density, using international real dollars. Specifically, 
instead of applying exchange rates, the local currency premiums are multiplied with the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) conversion factor, which is defined as the number of units of a country’s currency required to buy the 
same amount of goods and services in the domestic market as one U.S. dollar would buy in the U.S. Using PPP 
conversion factors is preferable to using exchange rates, since the latter are distorted by differences in exchange 
rate regimes.  Furthermore, PPP conversion factors take into account that the price of nontraded goods relative to 
traded goods increases with the income level of economies.  Since the death benefit of life insurance policies has 
to cover the typical household expenditures in both traded and nontraded goods, using exchange rates biases the 
insurance density of developing countries downward. However, since data on the PPP conversion factor are only 
available for the period 1975-2000, the insurance densities in international real dollars are constrained to this 
period.  We run all our regressions using this alternative indicator of life insurance density, without significant 
differences, so that we report only results with the general measure available over a longer time period. 
5 According to the UN National Accounts, life insurance premiums that imply claims of policy holders on 
insurance companies’ technical reserves are treated as savings, while insurers’ costs and profits are part of 
consumption. See United Nations Statistics Division (1993). 
6 See Browne and Kim (1993). 
7 For an excellent overview of the potential determinants of the demand and supply of life insurance products, 
see Skipper and Black (2000), chapter 3. 
8 Compare Beenstock, Dickinson, and Khajuria (1986).     28
                                                                                                                                                         
9 Browne and Kim (1993) use such a price variable, but note the bias introduced by different composition of the 
overall insurance portfolio across countries. 
10 This would result in a higher TC in Eq. (1). 
11 A higher life expectancy would be reflected by a lower p in Eq. (1). 
12 Compare Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986). 
13 This would be reflected by a lower δ in Eq. (1).  However, as pointed out by Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) 
quoting unpublished work by Outreville and Szpiro, risk aversion might also be negatively correlated with 
education.  
14 This would be reflected by a higher TC in Eq. (1). 
15 We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out. A similar debate on the role of education has taken 
place in the empirical growth literature; see Bils and Klenow (2000). 
16 This would be reflected by cross-country variation in δ in Eq. (1). 
17 Zelizer (1979) discusses the role that religions have in creating a cultural opposition to life insurance.   
18 The advent of Takaful insurance – a scholar approved insurance, licensed and marketed in countries with 
Muslim population - in the last decade, however, has increased the acceptance of life insurance amongst some 
Islamic populations. For further information see, http://www.insurance.com.my/zone_takaful/introduction.htm. 
19 This would be reflected by a higher TC in Eq. (1). 
20 Fixed interest rates and loan options imbedded in some life insurance policies, for example, spurred 
disintermediation in the U.S. life insurance market during the inflationary 1970's and 1980’s. 
21 Cargill and Troxel (1979) discuss the various impacts that inflation can have on the market for life insurance. 
22 Outreville (1992) also proposes a relationship between financial development and insurance markets.  
23 This would be reflected in a higher W in Eq. (1). 
24 The possibility of declining risk aversion with greater wealth, and the replacement of life insurance coverage 
with surplus assets in an individual's portfolio is expected to reduce the demand for life insurance among the 
wealthy. 
25 We include the dependent and several independent variables in logs, so that the coefficients can be interpreted 
as elasticities.   29
                                                                                                                                                         
26 Table A3 lists the countries in the sample.  The number of countries varies across the different life insurance 
measures and the samples do not completely overlap. 
27 The latter can be variables that are not included in our estimation since they are not varying over time or other 
underlying country characteristics that are not captured in any of our variables.  Among these omitted variables 
might be the regulation of the insurance sector, taxation, and the price variable, for which we use proxy variables 
such as the supply determinants described above, but do not have any direct measure. 
28 We test for the appropriateness of the fixed or random effects model with the Hausman test. Under the null 
hypothesis that random- and fixed effects estimates are not statistically different, both estimators are consistent, 
but the fixed effects model is inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis that both estimates are statistically 
different only the fixed-effects model gives consistent coefficients. We use the fixed effects model when the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level, and the random-effects model otherwise. 
29 Specifically, average years of schooling is available only at a five-year frequency and life expectancy, the 
share of the urban population and the Gini coefficient are not available on a yearly frequency for most countries.  
Further, the inflation rate and banking sector development might be subject to short-term business-cycle induced 
fluctuations. 
30 We re-run the regressions without the Private Savings Rate or Revolutions and Coups, but restricting the 
sample accordingly.  In neither case does income per capita enter significantly. 
31 This result matches the findings by Babbel (1981) that even the demand for inflation-indexed life insurance 
policies decreases during inflationary periods in Brazil. 
32 Following Browne and Kim (1993), we also used the average of current and previous year inflation, since 
consumers’ inflation expectations might be determined by previous inflation experience.  The results do not 
change. 
33 Since the young and old dependency ratios and life expectancy are highly correlated with each other, this 
result might be driven by multicollinearity.  We therefore test the robustness of the results by including only one 
of the three variables at a time.  The results do not change. 
34 We also tried two alternative indicators of institutional development, Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality, 
also from ICRG. Neither of the two enters significantly in the regressions.  
35 See the discussion in section 2.   30
                                                                                                                                                         
36 This might also explain the negative sign on life expectancy.  When we consider regressions with only the old 
or the young dependency ratio or life expectancy, only the old dependency ratio and life expectancy enter 
negatively and significantly at the 5% level. 
37 Since schooling data are only available on a 5-year frequency, we repeat the values for the intermediate years 
from the initial year of the corresponding 5-year period. 
38 As in the 5-year panel, we include the young and old dependency ratios and life expectancy separately, 
confirming our results. 
39 As in the 5-year panel, we control for mulitcollinarity by including only one of the following regressors at a 
time: old dependency ratio, young dependency ratio and life expectancy.  While life expectancy continues to 
enter significantly and negatively, neither of the two dependency ratios enters significantly.  
40 Most developing countries do not have life insurance data before 1978, so that the unbalanced panel 
regressions might be biased towards developed countries. We therefore re-ran all regressions of the 5-year panel, 
limiting the sample to the period 1981-2000.  The results do not change significantly.   
41 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), among many others, show that legal origin explains variation in 
financial development across countries. Easterly and Levine (2003) show that Good crops is a good predictor of 
institutional development.  
42 Legal origin and endowment explain 43% of the variation in schooling and banking sector development. 
43 We also ran a IV regression where we only instrumented schooling.  The OIR test, however, is rejected.   31
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations       
          
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
       Standard    
   Mean  Median  Deviation  Maximum  Minimum  Observations 
  Life Insurance Penetration  1.69  1.03  1.97  12.69  0.00  322 
  Life Insurance Density  264.51  68.88  442.45  3,275.39  0.14  322 
  Life Insurance in Private Savings  7.64  4.64  8.24  44.90  0.00  203 
  Life Insurance in Force to GDP  56.25  29.85  60.69  398.43  0.09  216 
  GDP per capita  9,463  4,393  10,090  45,061  193  451 
  Young Dependency  55.14  50.64  23.02  107.26  21.41  451 
  Old Dependency  12.52  9.64  6.44  27.65  4.50  451 
  Life Expectancy  68.17  70.71  8.07  80.48  41.63  451 
  Schooling 5.76  5.60  2.72  12.18  0.63  451 
  Inflation 14.37  7.32  25.63  222.33  -0.10  451 
  Banking sector development  47.29  38.62  32.65  180.88  5.41  451 
  Gini 37.41  34.89  9.61  61.88  20.46  221 
  Urbanization 60.26  61.00  21.63  100.00  8.11  451 
  Social Security  12.13  9.57  8.98  38.26  0.46  343 
  Real interest rate  26.44  1.80  260.74  3,686.98  -46.13  402 
  Anticipated inflation  14.31  7.41  25.52  232.85  -0.03  451 
  Permanent income  9,450  4,329  10,172  51,429  176  451 
  Secondary enrollment  67.71  69.51  29.58  152.84  7.67  399 
  Private Savings Rate  20.54  20.95  5.93  37.45  2.81  264 
  Revolutions and Coups  0.17  0.00  0.34  2.60  0.00  312 
  Human Development Indicator  0.75  0.77  0.13  0.93  0.35  304 
  Rule of Law  4.13  4.00  1.53  6.00  1.00  245 
  Inflation volatility  6.94  2.79  16.50  169.73  0.21  451 
  Institutional Development  0.48  0.54  0.78  -1.33  1.72  69 
  Catholic 41.04  29.80  40.03  0  96.9  69 
  Muslim 13.12  0.55  29.28  0  99.4  69 
  Protestant 14.64  2.60  25.26  0  97.8  69 
  British legal origin  0.26  0.00  0.44  0  1  69 
  French legal origin  0.45  0.00  0.50  0  1  69 
  Socialist legal origin  0.12  0.00  0.32  0  1  69 
  German legal origin  0.09  0.00  0.28  0  1  69 
  Scandinavian legal origin  0.07  0.00  0.26  0  1  69 
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Table 2: Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption Across Countries:   
                Expected Results        
          
     Savings  Mortality Risk  Annuity   Combined Effect  
     Component  Component  Component   
                 
Demographic  Young Dependency Ratio  -  +  -  ambiguous 
             
 Old  Dependency  Ratio  + - +  ambiguous 
             
 Life  expectancy  + - +  ambiguous 
             
 Education  +  + +  + 
             
 Religion  -muslim  -muslim  -muslim  -muslim 
             
 Urbanization  ratio  +  + +  + 
             
Economic  Income +  +  +  + 
             
  Private Savings in GNDI  ambiguous  no effect  ambiguous  ambiguous 
             
 Inflation  - - -  - 
             
 Inflation  volatility  - - -  - 
             
  Real interest rate  +  +  +  + 
             
 Banking  sector  development  +  + +  + 
             
 Social  Security  - - -  - 
             
 Gini  coefficient  ambiguous  ambiguous  ambiguous  ambiguous 
             
Institutional  Rule of Law  +  +  +  + 
             
  Revolutions and Coups  -  -  -  - 
             
 Institutional  Development  +  + +  + 
                 
This table assumes the division of life insurance consumption into the savings, mortality risk and annuity components. The 
first column describes the expected effects on the savings component, the second column on the mortality risk component 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Life Insurance in a Panel, 1961 - 2000; Alternative Measures of Life Insurance 
            














in Force to 
GDP 
Life Insurance 
in Force to 
GDP 
Sample Whole  sample 
Developing 
countries Whole  sample 
Developing 
countries Whole  sample 
Developing 
countries 
Econometric model  Fixed effects  Fixed effects Fixed effects  Random effects Random effects 
Random 
effects 
Constant -13.342  -19.270  1.232  -4.909  8.977  7.699 
 (2.13)**  (1.69)*  (0.18)  (0.46)  (1.21)  (0.63) 
GDP per capita  1.471  0.745  -0.254  -0.432  0.924  0.759 
 (4.41)***  (1.09)  (0.98)  (1.23)  (3.81)***  (2.28)** 
Young dependency  -0.299  1.208  -0.756  1.000  0.258  -0.428 
 (0.55)  (0.82)  (1.71)*  (1.03)  (0.47)  (0.38) 
Old dependency  1.730  0.885  1.604  1.511  -1.313  -1.423 
 (3.31)***  (0.41)  (3.40)***  (1.41)  (3.03)***  (1.40) 
Life expectancy  0.023  1.392  0.188  0.111  -3.403  -1.644 
 (0.02)  (0.69)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (1.94)*  (0.51) 
Schooling -0.169  -0.054  0.586  0.038  0.572  -0.231 
 (0.48)  (0.06)  (1.95)*  (0.08)  (1.39)  (0.41) 
Inflation -0.757  -0.600  -0.706  -0.473  -1.394  -1.979 
 (2.24)**  (1.15)  (2.62)***  (1.18)  (2.64)***  (2.25)** 
Banking sector development  0.375  0.938  0.371  0.750  0.446  0.204 
 (2.89)***  (2.69)***  (4.02)***  (3.22)***  (2.91)***  (0.58) 
Private Savings Rate       -0.660  -0.561     
         (3.97)***  (2.30)**       
              
F-test time dummies  1.17  0.18  3.40**  8.33*  15.05**  6.87 
              
Observations 322  141  203  88  216  75 
Number of Countries  66  37  56  28  47  22 
Time period  1961-2000  1961-2000  1971-1995  1971-1995  1961-1995  1961-1995 
              
R-squared within  0.6057  0.2437  0.7002  0.5517  0.3525  0.4181 
R-squared between  0.7146  0.3278 0.1914  0.0228  0.4895  0.3906 
R-squared overall  0.7211  0.3141 0.2878  0.0756  0.4256  0.3437 
              
Hausmann test (p-value)  0.001  0.021  0.0092  0.4985  0.491  0.9615 
            
t-statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively   
   41
 
Table 5: The Determinants of Life Insurance Penetration in an Annual Panel, 1961 - 2000   
        














Econometric model  Fixed effects 
Random 
effects Fixed  effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Random 
effects 
Constant  -3.288 13.928 -5.831 -1.828 -6.478 -3.694 
 (1.16)  (3.01)***  (2.19)**  (0.62)  (2.21)**  (0.80) 
GDP per capita  0.665  0.088  0.517  0.689    0.394 
  (4.89)*** (0.72)  (3.92)*** (4.96)***   (2.15)** 
Young  dependency  -0.586 -0.712 -0.401 -0.713 -0.474 0.069 
 (2.87)***  (2.94)***  (2.09)**  (3.32)***  (2.32)**  (0.13) 
Old dependency  0.920  0.506  1.137  0.901  0.689  0.121 
  (4.97)*** (2.40)**  (6.55)*** (4.38)*** (3.53)*** (0.25) 
Life  expectancy  -0.631 -4.056 -0.406 -0.890 -0.601 -0.688 
  (1.02) (3.59)***  (0.68) (1.37) (0.99) (0.81) 
Schooling -0.068  0.852  0.010  -0.156  -0.141  -0.154 
  (0.45) (4.49)***  (0.07) (0.97) (0.94) (0.56) 
Inflation -0.645  -0.687    -0.788  -0.686  -0.708 
 (4.97)***  (4.38)***    (4.41)***  (5.32)***  (3.88)*** 
Banking sector development  0.062  0.412  0.405  0.083  0.060  0.727 
 (2.29)**  (8.47)***  (9.55)***  (2.74)***  (2.20)**  (6.87)*** 
Private Savings Rate     0.184         
     (2.47)**         
Anticipated inflation       -0.834       
       (6.13)***       
Real interest rate         0.172     
         (2.07)**     
Permanent income           1.034   
               (5.91)***   
              
F-test time dummies  2.03***  80.21***  2.01***  1.73***  1.47**  20.34 
              
Observations  836 463 779 782 836 288 
Number  of  Countries  66 55 66 63 66 37 
Time  period  1961-2000 1970-1995 1961-2000 1961-2000 1961-2000 1961-2000 
              
R-squared  within  0.6166 0.6716 0.6589 0.6151 0.6221 0.4383 
R-squared between  0.3106  0.4882 0.3396 0.3072 0.3292 0.1289 
R-squared overall  0.3767  0.5245 0.4027 0.3523 0.3916 0.1945 
              
Hausmann test (p-value)  0.001  0.1384  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.9758 
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Table A2: Additional Correlations               
 
Life Insurance 















and Coups  HDI 
Gini  -0.2626***  1.0000               
Urbanization  0.2390***  -0.3428***  1.0000             
Social  security  0.2883***  -0.6471***  0.5010***  1.0000           
Real interest 
rate  -0.0851  0.2067***  0.0842*  -0.0220  1.0000          
Anticipated 
inflation  -0.2586***  0.2571***  0.0917*  -0.0739  0.6610***  1.0000        
Permanent 
income 0.5321***  -0.5737***  0.5831***  0.6096***  -0.0421  -0.2065***  1.0000         
Secondary 
enrolment 0.5475***  -0.6193***  0.6562*** 0.7204***  -0.0461 -0.1225**  0.7617***  1.0000      
Private Savings 
Rate 0.1902***  -0.2494***  0.1668***  0.1749***  0.0799  -0.0136  0.3366***  0.3194***  1.0000     
Revolutions 
and Coups  -0.0698  0.1528**  -0.2570***  -0.2867*** 0.0756  0.0879  -0.3100*** -0.2630*** -0.1847*** 1.0000   
HDI  0.4415***  -0.4772***  0.7555***  0.6363***  0.0008  -0.0826  0.7705*** 0.8544*** 0.2761*** -0.2812***  1.0000 
Rule  of  Law  0.3519***  -0.6012***  0.5253***  0.6120***  -0.0593  -0.2483*** 0.7354*** 0.7050*** 0.3078*** -0.4591***  0.7611*** 
Inflation 
volatility  -0.2125*** 0.2094***  0.0385  -0.0700  0.5876***  0.9002***  -0.1860***  -0.1120**  -0.0398  0.1246**  -0.0535 
Institutional 
Development  0.5232*** -0.6076***  0.6233*** 0.6477***  -0.0813 -0.3256***  0.8112***  0.8363***  0.3307**  -0.2650**  0.8547*** 
Catholic -0.2069*  0.2286*  0.0851  0.0348  0.2258*  0.2500**  -0.1082  -0.0890  -0.2702**  0.1945  0.1090 
Muslim -0.3057**  0.0878  -0.2667**  -0.2842**  -0.0878  -0.0604  -0.3167***  -0.3291***  -0.1323  -0.0248  -0.4936*** 
Protestant 0.3165**  -0.2236*  0.2488**  0.3201***  -0.0950  -0.2097*  0.5781***  0.4440***  -0.0659  -0.1618  0.3531*** 
British legal 
origin  0.3364***  0.1623 -0.1080  -0.1716  -0.1192 -0.1887 -0.013 -0.0667  0.2068 0.0077  -0.1031 
French legal 
origin  -0.4565***  0.4044***  -0.0302  -0.2524** 0.1937  0.1773  -0.3384*** -0.3296*** -0.4266*** 0.1928  -0.2571*** 
Socialist legal 
origin -0.2333*  -0.4044***  -0.1189  0.3565***  -0.0410  0.2621**  -0.2169*  0.0950  0.3284**  -0.0810  0.0844 
German legal 
origin  0.4518***  -0.2774** 0.1484  0.0397  -0.0575  -0.1917  0.4395*** 0.2421**  0.3667*** -0.1227  0.2566** 
Scandinavian 
legal origin  0.1000  -0.2591**  0.2296*  0.3059**  -0.0553  -0.1303  0.4621***  0.3842***  -0.1257  -0.1552  0.3070*** 
Good crops  0.1048  -0.6832***  0.3525***  0.5585***  -0.0373  0.0841  0.3076**  0.4809***  0.1646  -0.2639**  0.4157*** 
                  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
 
           




















Inflation volatility  -0.2076*** 1.0000              
Institutional 
Development 0.8513***  -0.2305*  1.0000            
Catholic -0.1380  0.2596**  -0.0200  1.0000           
Muslim -0.3333*** -0.1232 -0.4567*** -0.4221*** 1.0000         
Protestant 0.4883***  -0.1825 0.4861*'**  -0.3243*** -0.2348*  1.0000        
British legal origin  0.0492  -0.1794  0.1092  -0.3584*** -0.0229  0.0441  1.0000       
French legal origin  -0.4847*** 0.1201 -0.4114***  0.5157***  0.2495**  -0.4050***  -0.5568*** 1.0000      
Socialist legal origin  0.1489  0.2712  -0.0528  0.0009  -0.1357  -0.1563  -0.2232*  -0.3271*** 1.0000    
German  legal  origin  0.2573**  -0.1469  0.2632**  -0.0812 -0.1356  0.0470  -0.1902 -0.2787**  -0.1118 1.0000   
Scandinavian legal 
origin 0.3785***  -0.0967 0.3804**  -0.2847**  -0.1244 0.8429***  -0.1723  -0.2525**  -0.1012  -0.0863  1.0000 
Good crops  0.4268***  0.0872  0.3737**  -0.0166 -0.1789  0.0545  -0.1183 -0.2963**  0.4418***  0.1977 0.0042 
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Table A3: Countries in the Sample    
     
      
     
   Life Insurance   Life Insurance   Life Insurance  
   Penetration / Density  in Private Savings in Force to GDP 
Algeria *       
Argentina *  *   
Australia *  *  * 
Austria *  *  * 
Belgium *  *  * 
Brazil *  *  * 
Bulgaria *     
Cameroon *  *   
Canada *  *  * 
Chile *  *  * 
China *  *   
Colombia *  *   
Costa Rica  *  *  * 
Croatia *     
Cyprus *  *   
Czech Republic  *     
Denmark *  *  * 
Dominican Republic  *  *  * 
Ecuador *  *  * 
Egypt *  *  * 
El Salvador  *     
Fiji       * 
Finland *  *  * 
France *  *  * 
Germany *  *  * 
Great Britain  *  *  * 
Greece *  *  * 
Guatemala *  *  * 
Honduras       * 
Hong Kong  *  *   
Hungary *     
Iceland *  *  * 
India *  *  * 
Indonesia *  *  * 
Iran *  *   
Ireland *  *  * 
Israel *  *  * 
Italy *  *  * 
Japan *  *  * 
Kenya *  *     50
Korea *  *  * 
Malaysia *  *  * 
Mexico *  *  * 
Netherlands *  *  * 
New Zealand  *  *  * 
Norway *  *  * 
Pakistan *  *  * 
Panama *  *   
Peru *  *  * 
Philippines *  *  * 
Poland *      * 
Portugal *  *  * 
Romania *     
Singapore *  *   
Slovenia *     
South Africa  *  *  * 
Spain *  *  * 
Sweden *  *  * 
Switzerland *  *  * 
Syria *     
Taiwan *  *  * 
Thailand *  *  * 
Tunisia *  *  * 
Turkey *  *   
Uruguay *  *  * 
USA *  *  * 
Venezuela *  *  * 
Zimbabwe *  *    
5
1
 